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ABSTRACT
Using a sample of emerging markets that are integrated into global bond markets, we analyze the
collapse and recovery phase of output collapses that coincide with systemic sudden stops, defined
as periods of skyrocketing aggregate bond spreads and large capital flow reversals. Our findings
indicate the presence of a very similar pattern across different episodes: output recovers with
virtually no recovery in either domestic or foreign credit, a phenomenon that we call Phoenix
Miracle, where output “rises from its ashes”, suggesting that firms go through a process of financial
engineering to restore liquidity outside the formal credit markets. Moreover, we show that the US
Great Depression could be catalogued as a Phoenix Miracle. However, in contrast to the US Great
Depression, EM output collapses occur in a context of accelerating price inflation and falling real
wages, casting doubts on price deflation and nominal wage rigidity as key elements in explaining




















In the last quarter century, the Emerging Market (EM) landscape has been 
plagued with financial crises of severe magnitude.  Many of these crises occurred during 
periods of Systemic Sudden Stop (henceforth, 3S), i.e., periods of capital inflow collapse, 
or Sudden Stop, and skyrocketing EM aggregate bond spreads that affected a wide range 
of EM countries at approximately the same time and, thus, had a systemic component.  In 
several instances, financial crises coincided with severe output losses and dire social 
consequences. 
Turmoil in EM world capital markets, coupled with country-specific 
vulnerabilities, such as the level of domestic liability dollarization (DLD), i.e., foreign-
exchange denominated debt contracts in the domestic capital market,
1 and the size of the 
supply of tradable goods, appear to be key in explaining recent financial crises in EMs 
involving sudden interruptions in capital flows.
2  Shocks at the heart of capital markets, 
or “incipient” Sudden Stops in the Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005) lexicon, have 
typically been a triggering factor behind these crises.  Contagion, for example⎯be it 
because countries are treated as part of a particular asset class, borrow from the same set 
of banks, are part of the same set of investment fund portfolios, or simply because 
liquidity shocks to international investors spread to different countries as they sell assets 
in their portfolio to restore liquidity⎯may work like a market test for EMs.
3  As Calvo 
and Talvi (2005) point out, these market tests can be followed by a painful adjustment 
                                                 
1 DLD is related but quite different from Original Sin, a concept popularized by Eichengreen, Hausmann 
and Panizza (2005), which encompasses foreign debt and, in some empirical tests, excludes the domestic 
capital market (see, e.g., Frankel and Cavallo (2004)). 
2 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), Calvo and Talvi (2005), and 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005). 
3 For a discussion of a rationale for the spread of liquidity shocks see, for example, Calvo (1999). 
  1and sharp reduction in economic growth, or become a minor recession depending on 
domestic vulnerabilities. 
The present paper is, first and foremost, an attempt at extracting stylized facts 
characterizing 3S output collapses, and, in particular their post-collapse recovery phase, 
i.e., how economies come out from output collapses that occur in the context of 3S.  
Periods of 3S offer a unique natural experiment: the shock is large and easy to identify, it 
originates in global capital markets, and it hits several countries at the about the same 
time.  
  These episodes are characterized by two salient features.  First, there is a dramatic 
collapse in output (for our sample of collapses, the average fall in GDP is 10 percent) 
accompanied by a collapse in credit, but without any correspondingly sharp collapse in 
either physical capital or the labor force.  Second, recovery to pre-crisis output is swift 
and “credit-less”―i.e., output grows back to pre-crisis levels without any significant 
recovery in domestic or external credit.  Thus, although a credit crunch appears to be 
central for explaining output collapse, recovery can take place without credit.  This 
remarkable phenomenon that resembles the feat of the proverbial bird “rising from its 
ashes” prompted us to call it Phoenix Miracle. 
To avoid misunderstandings, it is worth pointing out at the outset that although 
credit cannot account for the strong output expansion following output collapse, it would 
be wrong to infer that credit is irrelevant.  Our conjecture, spelled out in the model of 
Section IV, is that, faced with a credit crunch, the economy strives to develop new 
sources of financing that lie outside the formal credit market.  Developing these new 
sources, such as postponing investment projects to create liquidity, is costly.  Actually, 
  2some of the costs could linger on long after the crisis episode is over, which is in line 
with the Cerra and Chaman Saxena (2005) finding that, on average, crises have a 
negative effect on long-run growth.
4   
  We focus on a sample of EMs that are integrated in world capital markets⎯and, 
thus, are likely to be affected by 3S events.
5  The sample includes most of the recent 
high-profile crisis episodes, such as the Tequila crisis episodes (Argentina 1995, Mexico 
1995, Turkey 1995), East Asian crisis episodes (Indonesia 1998, Malaysia 1998, 
Thailand 1998) and the Russian crisis episodes of the late 1990s (Ecuador 1999, Turkey 
1999, Argentina 2002), as well as the Latin American Debt Crisis episodes of the 1980s 
(Argentina 1982, Brazil, 1983, Chile 1983, Mexico 1983, Peru 1983, Venezuela 1983, 
Uruguay 1984). 
Main Findings 
  Output collapse episodes that occurred in the context of 3S exhibit a clear-cut 
pattern summarized by the following characteristics:
6  
•  Post-collapse recoveries tend to be steep, i.e., economic activity reaches its pre-
crisis levels relatively quickly, on average, less than three years following the 
output trough. 
•  Total factor productivity (TFP)⎯computed according to standard growth 
accounting, using capital and labor as factors of production⎯mimics the behavior 
of output: It falls sharply during the collapse phase, only to recover swiftly 
                                                 
4 In contrast to Cerra and Chaman Saxena (2005), however, who examine recoveries from recessions for a 
large set of developed and developing countries, we focus on 3S collapses, comprising episodes in which 
the dominant shock is financial and output contraction is “large.” 
5 The sample comprises countries tracked by JP Morgan in its global Emerging Market Bond Index.  See 
Section II for more details. 
6 As will be described in Section II, we define and output collapse as a 4.4% decline of GDP from pre-crisis 
peak to trough (corresponding to the median contraction in our sample). 
  3afterwards.  Moreover, variations in TFP account for the bulk of the variation in 
output throughout the collapse-recovery process.
7 
•  The capital stock remains relatively constant throughout the collapse-recovery 
phase, while investment collapses together with output, and recovers weakly by 
the time output recovers to pre-crisis levels. 
•  Domestic and external credit collapse together with output, but output recovery 
materializes with virtually no recovery in either domestic or external credit, i.e. 
the recovery could be labeled “credit-less.” 
 
A key piece of evidence that provides some clues about the nature of 3S collapses 
and their recovery phase is the behavior of TFP, shown in Figure 1, panel (A).
 8 9     Figure 
1 suggests that at the time output recovers, TFP is not significantly different from that 
prevailing before 3S (this is confirmed by empirical tests in Section III).  But TFP falls 
sharply together with output, and recovers fully by the time of output reaches its pre-
crisis levels, displaying the same V-shaped pattern depicted by output.  Moreover, TFP 





                                                 
7 Employment also follows a V-shaped pattern similar to that of output, but it only accounts for a small 
fraction of the variation in output relative to TFP. 
8 Each of the variables presented there is an average of the twenty-two 3S collapse episodes that will be 
discussed in Section III along with formal tests. 
9 We define a pre-crisis peak as the time when output reaches its maximum value before a trough, and a full 
recovery as the time when output recovers to pre-crisis peak levels following collapse.  See Section II for 
more details. 
  4Figure 1. The Phoenix Miracle: A Comparison with the US Great Depression 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































GDP Index Current Account Balance % GDP    
Note: Various Sources. See Data Appendix for details.   
  5This severe fall and subsequent “resurrection” in TFP is very intriguing because, 
if attributed only to technological shocks, it would imply an implausibly large and sudden 
loss of memory, a “massive Alzheimer’s attack,” so to say, regarding the production 
process, and a subsequent and sudden recovery from Alzheimer’s disease following 
output collapse.  These swings in measured TFP are hard to attribute to technological 
factors.  An alternative conjecture is that true TFP remains roughly the same throughout 
the collapse-recovery process, and that swings in measured TFP stem from a key missing 
variable—a main suspect being financial constraints associated with 3S.  
Stagnation of true TFP is not an implausible outcome.  During a phase of 
dramatic financial disarray, firms are likely to devote much of their attention to the re-
composition of their financing, paying little attention to increasing factor productivity.  
Moreover, constancy in TFP throughout the collapse-recovery process would justify 
dating “recovery” by the point in time when output attains its pre-crisis level.
10  This 
definition of full recovery leads us to conclude that output recovery is swift.  But swift 
recovery is not tantamount to asserting that the financial crisis is costless.  In fact, 
economies subject to these crises may take a long time to recover to trend levels that 
would have prevailed in the absence of a crisis.   Thus, our finding of a swift recovery to 
pre-crisis levels is not inconsistent with evidence presented for other major crises, such as 
the US Great Depression, indicating that it takes a prolonged period of time for output to 
recover to trend levels (see, for example, Cole and Ohanian (1999)).   
Panel (B) shows the relative constancy of the capital stock throughout the 
collapse-recovery process.  Panel (C) illustrates that investment falls hand-in-hand with 
                                                 
10 If our conjecture about the existence of a key missing variable proves to be right, TFP during a crisis 
episode could tongue-in-cheek be called “Totally Fictitious Productivity.” 
  6output, and recovers feebly as output bounces back to pre-crisis levels.  In fact, it is 
precisely the collapse in investment, and its failure to recover, that explains the constancy 
of the capital stock.  Panels (D), and (E) contrast the V-shaped pattern in output from pre-
crisis peak to full recovery with that of domestic bank credit to the private sector and 
external credit (proxied by the current account balance), which collapse together with 
output, but fail to recover as output goes back to pre-crisis levels.  As noted above, this 
“credit-less” recovery is what we call “Phoenix Miracle”. 
Such a surprising set of characteristics of post-collapse recoveries in EMs led us 
to the question of whether one of the most studied⎯and still controversial⎯episodes of 
output collapse, i.e., the US 1930s Great Depression, could also be catalogued as a 
Phoenix Miracle. Besides, crises involving severe output losses are the order of the day in 
EMs, and comparisons with the US Great Depression are potentially illuminating both for 
understanding the forces at work in EM crises, and in providing a fresh look at the US 
Great Depression in light of EM experience. 
 Our findings show that the parallels are striking, but so are the differences, and 
both are quite revealing.  The US Great Depression episode is similar to that of EMs in 
three dimensions: (i) Measured TFP and output initially collapse, and eventually recover 
to pre-crisis levels (Figure 1, panel (F)). (ii) The capital stock remains relatively constant, 
while investment collapses together with output but recovers only feebly as output 
reaches its pre-crisis levels (Figure 1, panels (G) and (H)).  (iii) Post-collapse recovery is 
“credit-less”, i.e., it materializes with virtually no recovery in domestic bank credit (see 
Figure 1, panel (I)).  
  7However, the US Great Depression differs substantially from output collapses in 
EMs in many other aspects.   To begin with, in the Great Depression the current account 
balance as a share of GDP slightly deteriorates throughout the collapse-recovery phase.  
This suggests that the credit crunch mostly stems from the domestic banking system 
rather than from the external front.  Second, during the contraction phase, the US Great 
Depression exhibits price deflation, no currency devaluation, and a substantial increase in 
real wages (see Figure 2, Panels E through H).
11  In stark contrast to these developments, 
the output collapse phase in EMs is characterized by acceleration in price inflation, sharp 
nominal (and real) currency depreciation, and sharp fall in real wages (see Figure 2, 
panels A through D). 
These differences are quite illuminating for two reasons:  First, by remaining on 
gold, the US kept its exchange rate unchanged at its pre-crisis peak level for almost four 
years.  Several prominent explanations of the Great Depression assign a crucial role to 
the Gold Standard and the limits it imposed on expansionary monetary policy.  Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963), for example, suggest that if money supply had not been allowed to 
fall (a policy that the Federal Reserve could have implemented), the Great Depression 
would at worst be listed among the set of mild (and boring) US recessions, as deflation 
would have been avoided.  In contrast to the US deflationary experience, EM collapse 
episodes are characterized by a steady rise in the nominal exchange rate and an 
acceleration of inflation during the output contraction phase, a fact that calls into question 
the hypothesis that price deflation per se is an essential ingredient in triggering output 
collapse.   
 
                                                 
11 Real wages are obtained using as deflator the wholesale price index. 
  8Figure 2. Selected Variables:  A Comparison with the US Great Depression 










































































































































































































































































































































































































GDP Index Real Wage Index    
Note: Various Sources. See Data Appendix for details.   
  
    Second, leading explanations for the size and persistence of output contraction 
during the Great Depression have relied on two major rigidities, namely, nominal wage 
stickiness and non-contingent financial contracts, that, in the face of price deflation, 
caused significant increases in real output wages and in real debt⎯the latter known as 
  912 Debt Deflation, discussed by Irving Fisher (1933).   The real wage increase argument, 
due to nominal wage rigidities and price deflation, is clearly consistent with rising 
unemployment.  On the other hand, the Debt Deflation argument relies on the existence 
of largely unanticipated and sizable price falls that result in a sharp increase in real ex-
post interest rates, triggering bankruptcies in highly indebted sectors and possibly 
bringing about financial crisis.  Interestingly, the evidence presented in this paper for the 
EM sample of output collapses strongly suggests that nominal wage stickiness is not a 
key factor since, as noted, the real wage sharply falls during the phase of output collapse 
(see Figure 1, Panel D).  This evidence, thus, suggests that Debt Deflation, or some 
financial crisis variant, may be at the heart of all of these crises (including the Great 
Depression). 
  EM crises triggered during periods of 3S have been characterized by a sharp 
increase in real interest rates faced by borrowers.
 13   However, Debt Deflation as such 
cannot be claimed to be a relevant factor in our EM sample because, as noted, currency 
devaluation and inflation acceleration rather than price deflation are the rule in EM crisis 
episodes.  Nonetheless, a similar effect is produced by Liability Dollarization, i.e., 
foreign-exchange denominated debt, a common feature in EMs.
14  Under those 
circumstances, real depreciation increases the output value of outstanding debt 
(particularly in non-tradable firms), causing the real value of debt to inflate.  Thus, sharp 
nominal (and real) currency devaluation in the presence of Liability Dollarization may 
                                                 
12 For a very useful exposition and evidence on these leading explanations of the US Great Depression, see 
Bernanke (1995). 
13 For example, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis in August 1998, country risk, as measured by 
aggregate indices such as J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index, skyrocketed beyond 1700 basis 
points above US Treasuries. 
14 As noted in footnote 1, in the literature there are different concepts associated with this phenomenon.  By 
Liability Dollarization we refer to any situation in which foreign-exchange debts play a prominent role. 
  10have worked in EMs as a new version of Fisher’s Debt Deflation syndrome, and may be 
central in explaining output collapses.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the choice of 
sample and elaborates further on the object of study.  Section III highlights key stylized 
facts of post-collapse recoveries following 3S episodes in EMs, and provides empirical 
support for the significance of these facts.  It also highlights in detail similarities and 
differences between EM collapses and the US Great Depression.  Section IV introduces a 
partial equilibrium model with financial frictions that helps to capture the essential 
elements of the observed Phoenix Miracle phenomena concerning output, investment and 
credit.  Section V concludes with a brief summary and some implications.  
  
II.  Output Collapse in Emerging Markets: The Sample 
 
Given the considerations outlined above regarding 3S episodes, natural candidates 
for the analysis of collapses in output related to systemic financial turmoil are countries 
that are integrated into the world capital market.  One possible measure of integration is 
the ability to place a sizeable amount of international bonds.  For this reason, the sample 
selected for the analysis is composed of countries that are tracked by JP Morgan to 
construct its global Emerging Market Bond Index, or global EMBI, with observations 
spanning the period 1980-2004.
15  This sample increases the chances of capturing 
episodes stemming from systemic credit shocks, as opposed to the myriad of other factors 
behind output contractions.    
                                                 
15 The list of countries includes Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela (see Data Appendix for details). 
  11Unless swings in measured TFP were attributed to technological factors, periods 
of 3S involving output collapses and Phoenix Miracle-type recoveries are highly 
suggestive of sudden “underutilization of capacity”.
16  This is so, because after large 
drops in output, it would be difficult to rationalize speedy post-collapse recovery, unless 
idle resources are part of the equation (recall that capital and labor exhibit small 
fluctuations, and there is virtually no recovery in foreign or domestic credit).  It is for this 
reason that we focus on large output downturns. 
We focus next on the definition of output collapse.  We start by looking at 
cumulative contractions in output―i.e., the accumulation of consecutive yearly 
contractions in output―for our sample of EMs throughout the period 1980-2004.  We 
cover this particular timeframe because it represents a phase where international capital 
flows to EMs became substantial (after their sustained rise in the 1970s) and subject to 
considerable aggregate swings, as shown in Figure 4.  
The resulting distribution of cumulative contractions comprising all countries and 
periods is shown in Figure 5, for a total of 83 episodes (see Table 1 of the Appendix for a 
complete list).  It is clearly asymmetric, with an average cumulative contraction of 7.8 
percent, and a large concentration around small drops in output.  We use this distribution 
to define a collapse as a contraction that lies to the left of the median, implying a cut-off 
output contraction of 4.4 percent.  For each of these episodes, we define a pre-crisis peak, 
trough and full recovery point.
17  The pre-crisis peak is the period displaying the 
                                                 
16 See the model in Section IV where “capacity underutilization” is defined as a deviation from financially 
unconstrained optima. 
 
17 To make sure that we are capturing the appropriate trough point for collapse episodes, we look for 
additional contractions in output to the right of the initially detected trough that do not qualify as collapses 
and lie no more than three periods away from the initially detected trough (thus allowing for temporary 
positive growth “blips” of up to two periods and a “double dip” contraction).  If the cumulative collapse in 
  12maximum level of output preceding a trough, and the full recovery point is that period in 
which the pre-crisis peak output level is fully restored.
18  A trough is the local minimum 
following the onset of a crisis.  This methodology led to the identification of 45 episodes 
of output collapse spanning the period 1980-2004.   
 



































































































































































Net capital flows to Emerging Countries in East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa.
Net private capital flows consist of private debt and nondebt flows. Private debt flows include commercial bank lending, bonds, and other private credits; nondebt 








                                                                                                                                                 
output at the new trough exceeds that of the initially detected trough, we extend the collapse episode to 
include the new trough point, so that it becomes part of the same episode.  This procedure led to the 
reclassification of trough points for only five episodes out of a sample comprising 83 episodes, namely, 
Brazil 1983, Nigeria 1984, Peru 1990, Czech Republic 1992, and Croatia 1993.   
 
18 For the very few collapse episodes in which output did not fully recover before being hit by another 
collapse episode, we take the observation showing the highest value of output prior to the next collapse as 
the full recovery point.  This occurred for only a few episodes:  Argentina 1982, Brazil 1990, Côte d’Ivoire 
1990 and 2000, Russia 1996, and Bulgaria 1993. 






























































With these episodes at hand, we now turn our attention to those that occurred 
during periods of 3S.  We believe this is a key element to consider, not only because of 
the reasons already stated earlier, but also because, in contrast to non-3S episodes that 
may cover a wide variety of shocks with several possible outcomes, 3S episodes are 
characterized by very specific phenomena related to disruption in access to international 
credit markets. 
                                                 
19 To make sure that we are capturing the appropriate trough point for collapse episodes, we look for 
additional contractions in output to the right of the initially detected trough that do not qualify as collapses 
and lie no more than three periods away from the initially detected trough (thus allowing for temporary 
positive growth “blips” of up to two periods and a “double dip” contraction).  If the cumulative collapse in 
output at the new trough exceeds that of the initially detected trough, we extend the collapse episode to 
include the new trough point, so that it becomes part of the same episode.  This procedure led to the 
reclassification of trough points for only five episodes out of a sample comprising 83 episodes, namely, 
Brazil 1983, Nigeria 1984, Peru 1990, Czech Republic 1992, and Croatia 1993.   
 
20 For the very few collapse episodes in which output did not fully recover before being hit by another 
collapse episode, we take the observation showing the highest value of output prior to the next collapse as 
the full recovery point.  This occurred for only a few episodes:  Argentina 1982, Brazil 1990, Côte d’Ivoire 
1990 and 2000, Russia 1996, and Bulgaria 1993. 
  143S collapses are portrayed as output collapses that occur during a period of 
plummeting capital flows in a context of substantial turmoil in global capital markets.  In 
similar fashion to Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005), we define a 3S window as the 
union of 
•  a capital-flow window containing a large fall in capital flows for a given country 
exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (that starts when the fall in 
capital flows exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one 
standard deviation) that overlaps at any point in time with  
•  an aggregate-spread window containing a spike in the aggregate EMBI spread 
exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (which starts when the 
aggregate EMBI spread exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is 
smaller than one standard deviation).
21   
If either the pre-crisis peak or trough of a previously identified output collapse episode 
falls within the 3S window, it is classified as a 3S collapse.  This classification yields a 
group of twenty-two 3S collapses that contains most of the well-known crises throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, including the Latin American Debt Crisis episodes (Argentina 
1982, Brazil 1983, Chile 1983, Mexico 1983, Peru 1983, Venezuela 1983, Uruguay 
1984), the Tequila crisis episodes (Argentina 1995, Mexico 1995, Turkey 1995), the East 
Asian crisis episodes (Indonesia 1998, Malaysia 1998, Thailand 1998) and the Russian 
crisis episodes of the late 1990s (Ecuador 1999, Turkey 1999, Argentina 2002).  Table 2 
of the Appendix provides a complete list. 
 
                                                 
21 Given that the EMBI is not available for the 1980s, we used the Federal Funds rate instead as a proxy 
that captures the cost of access to international financing for EMs. This is a reasonable assumption since 
bank credit was the dominant source of funding for EMs during that period (see Data Appendix for details).  
  15III.  Output Collapses in EMs under Systemic Capital Market Turmoil: Stylized 
Facts 
We now turn to the analysis of the behavior of a key set of variables throughout 
3S collapse episodes.  We first take a look at the performance of five variables, namely, 
TFP, the capital stock, investment, private sector bank credit, and the current account 
balance (as a measure of external financing) relative to GDP.  Behavior for the average 
episode is shown in Figure 1, covering a five-year window centered on troughs in output 
that tracks the whole phase from pre-crisis peak to full recovery.  Notice that given the 
nature of the analysis at hand, we focus on “full recovery” in output levels as opposed to 
trends.  The fact that true TFP likely remains constant throughout the collapse-recovery 
process (as it was argued in the introduction, and will be shown below), justifies dating 
“recovery” by the point in time when output attains its pre-crisis level.  Otherwise, if true 
TFP had risen in the interim, full recovery would have to take that into account by, for 
example, dating recovery by the point in time when the output/true TFP ratio goes back 
to its pre-crisis level.
22   
The first feature that can readily be observed is that the average path of GDP from 
pre-crisis peak to full recovery is clearly V-shaped.  Average output collapses by 7 
percent within a two-year period, and recovers fully in just about two years.
23  Average 
measured TFP follows a very similar pattern: it falls by 8.4 percent from peak to trough 
and then quickly recovers, filling almost 78 percent of the initial gap at the time output 
                                                 
22 Besides, working with trend levels would immediately pose one concern:  Many EM crisis episodes are 
too recent to obtain proper estimates of trend levels. 
23 The figure of 7 percent, indicating the fall in average output differs from the average fall in output across 
all 22 episodes, which is 10 percent.  Similarly, the recovery phase of average output is 2 years, while the 
average recovery phase across all 22 episodes is 2.8 years.   
  1624 recovers fully (see Figure 1 panel A).   It is important to highlight that about 100 percent 
of the fall in average output from peak to trough can be accounted for by the fall in 
measured TFP.
25  Similarly, 76 percent of the increase in output from trough to recovery 
is explained by increases in measured TFP.  This is a key stylized fact that puts into 
question the explanation that output recovery may be due to technological change.  It 
rather suggests that TFP, as measured, is missing a central element, e.g., the effects of 
credit disarray on “capacity utilization”.        
The average capital stock increases by 5 percent from peak to trough, falls slightly 
(1.2 percent) from trough to recovery (Figure 1, Panel (B)), and is only 3.8 percent higher 
than its pre-crisis level by the time of full recovery in output.  This behavior is consistent 
with the dramatic fall in investment, which exceeds that in output.  Figure 1, Panel C 
shows that average investment hits its trough at the same time that GDP does, declining 
by about 42 percent in real terms relative to its value at pre-crisis peak time.  At the time 
of full recovery, two years after the slump, only 35 percent of the investment gap has 
been filled. 
In terms of domestic financing, Panel D of Figure 1 shows that average domestic 
bank credit to the private sector collapses by about 15 percent in real terms from pre-
crisis peak to trough, and none of the initial credit gap is closed at the time of full 
                                                 
24 For each episode in the sample, measured TFP is obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with physical capital and labor as arguments, of the type (where Y is output, A 
is measured TFP, K is the capital stock, and L is employment).  Capital stocks and investment data as of 
1980 are obtained from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).  The capital stock is updated by using investment 
data at constant prices from our dataset, assuming a depreciation rate of 8 percent per year (see Mendoza 
and Durdu (forthcoming) for an estimation of the depreciation rate for the Mexican case, which we take as 
representative of our sample of EMs).  A uniform share of capital in total income (α) of 0.4 is given to all 
countries in the sample (following Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993)).    
) 1 ( α α − = t L t K t A t Y
25 When estimating the contribution of each factor to changes in (log) output, we make use of the fact that 
for the Cobb-Douglas production function outlined above, (log) changes in output are determined by:  
   ) log )(log 1 ( ) log (log log log log log i t L t L i t K t K i t A t A i t Y t Y − − − + − − + − − = − − α α
  17recovery.  External financing, as measured by the current account balance, follows a 
pattern similar to that of domestic financing (see Figure 1, Panel E).  The average current 
account balance adjusts by about 6 percentage points of GDP from pre-crisis peak to 
trough, and it remains relatively constant at high surplus levels thereafter, implying that 
only close to 13 percent of the initial current account reversal is closed at the time of full 
recovery.    
We complement this visual inspection with statistical tests, starting with the 
behavior of TFP.  We are interested in determining significant percentage differences in 
TFP between pre-crisis peak, trough, and full recovery points, based on individual 
episode values.  In analogous fashion to difference-in-means tests, we run a regression of 
percentage differences in TFP (covering all episodes) against a constant to determine 
their significance using standard t-statistics.  This procedure is applied to differences 
from pre-crisis peak to trough, trough to full recovery, and pre-crisis peak to full 
recovery.  Results are shown in Table 1.  They indicate that indeed measured TFP falls 
on average by about 9.5 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough (significant at the 1 
percent level), a very similar figure to that of the average collapse in GDP from pre-crisis 
peak to trough of 10 percent.  Measured TFP quickly catches up, increasing from trough 
to full-recovery time by 10 percent (significant at the 1 percent level).  As a matter of 
fact, measured TFP at full recovery time is not significantly different prevailing TFP 
levels at pre-crisis peak time.     
We also report the behavior of the capital stock, which increases on average by 
3.7 percent from peak to trough (significant at the 1 percent level), and falls at a rate of 
3.2 percent from trough to recovery (significant at the 10 percent level)—resulting in no 
  18significant change from peak to recovery.  Investment as a share of GDP collapses on 
average by about 34 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough. The investment-to-GDP ratio 
remains around 23 percent below its pre-crisis peak value at full recovery time (all these 
differences are significant at the 1 percent level). 
Table 1. 3S Collapse Episodes:  Average Differences 
Along Pre-Crisis Peaks, Troughs, and Full Recovery Points 
Peak to Through  Trough to Recovery  Peak To Recovery 
  
Total Factor Productivity  -9.497***   9.874***  -0.785 
  [ 1.474]  [ 1.719]  [ 1.378] 
  17 17 17 
Capital Stock   3.735***  -3.177*  0.639 
  [ 1.124]  [ 1.669]  [ 2.489] 
  21 21 21 
Investment/GDP -34.234***    20.210***  -23.240*** 
   [ 4.202]  [ 6.551]  [ 5.030] 
    22 22 22 
Credit/GDP 3.948  -20.014***  -16.768** 
   [ 5.455]  [ 5.542]  [ 7.020] 
    22 22 22 
Current Account Balance/GDP   5.706***  -1.545   4.161*** 
   [ 1.689]  [ 1.078]  [ 1.359] 
  22 22 22 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Number of episodes is also reported. Coefficients show percentages 
differences for Total Factor Productivity, Capital Stock, Investment and Credit, and differences in percent 
of GDP for the Current Account Balance. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Tests on private sector credit as a share of GDP and the current account balance (a 
measure of foreign financing) as a share of GDP confirm the statistical significance of the 
behavior suggested by Panels D and E of Figure 1.  Credit as a share of GDP does not 
change much from pre-crisis peak to trough (the estimated coefficient is small and not 
significantly different from zero), implying that the collapse in output is accompanied by 
a collapse in credit of similar magnitude.  However, there is a large and significant drop 
of about 20 percent in the credit-to-GDP ratio between trough and full recovery, 
  19providing clear indication that credit remains stagnant at trough levels while GDP 
recovers (see Table 1).  At full recovery, credit as a share of GDP is close to 17 percent 
lower than its prevailing value at the pre-crisis peak of the average episode.
26  An 
interesting difference with mild recessions is that “credit-less” recovery seems to be 
typical for output collapses, but not for mild recessions, in which credit falls together 
with output from peak to trough, but then recovers together with output.
27  As a matter of 
fact, for mild recessions credit as a share of GDP at the time of full recovery is not 
significantly different from its pre-crisis value (see Appendix I for details).  Thus, mild 
recessions are not Phoenix Miracles. 
Similar results are obtained with foreign financing, where, after the crisis, a 
marked de-leveraging process takes place.  This is shown by the severe adjustment in the 
current account balance, which increases significantly from pre-crisis peak to trough by 
about 6 percentage points of GDP (see Table 1) and remains in surplus thereafter (the 
difference from trough to full recovery is relatively small and not significant), implying 
that there should be large and significant changes between pre-crisis peak and full 
recovery; this is confirmed by the pre-crisis peak to full recovery test presented in Table 
1.  As a matter of fact, the current account balance remains on average about 4 points of 
GDP higher at full recovery than at pre-crisis peak (see Table 1). 
   In summary, episodes of output collapse in the context of 3S seem to be 
characterized by substantial collapses in bank credit and the current account deficit, and 
                                                 
26 An interesting observation is that more than two-thirds of the 22 episodes of systemic output collapse 
identified here were accompanied by “locally systemic” banking crises—i.e., failure of a large number of 
banks in the domestic banking system (“locally systemic” banking crisis episodes are obtained from Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003)).  This may help to explain why credit remains stagnant during the output recovery 
phase.      
27 Mild recessions are defined as cumulative contractions smaller than the median. 
  20little or no recovery in either at full recovery time, as if output were “rising from its 
ashes.”  Moreover, on average, there is no indication of a substantial change in either 
capital or employment levels, while there is a pronounced downswing and upswing in 
measured productivity, and a clear drop in investment as a share of GDP that fails to 
recover fully.
28
One possible interpretation for the behavior of investment is that, in the absence 
of domestic or external credit, lower investment makes room for working capital 
accumulation which, coupled with “excess capacity”, leads to output recovery.
29 30     
However, even if the drop in investment from pre-crisis levels were indeed used as a 
“source of financing” in times of loss of access to credit markets, there are other possible 
instruments of financial engineering that could compete with investment, as would be the 
case of greater tax evasion, temporarily lower wages, and the re-composition of earnings.  
An analysis of the financial engineering firms go through in times of 3S is left for a 
future paper.    
Having identified Phoenix Miracle-type behavior across 3S episodes, we now turn 
to the analysis of an additional set of variables of interest and explore their performance 
along the post-collapse recovery phase.  This set of variables was chosen not only 
because they are interesting in their own right, but also in order to understand similarities 
and differences with one of the most studied output collapse episodes: the US Great 
Depression of the 1930s.  This comparison is carried out along two dimensions.  First, it 
                                                 
28 Average employment levels fall slightly from peak to trough, and then slightly surpass pre-crisis levels at 
the time of output recovery.  However, similar tests as those performed on other variables do not indicate a 
significant difference between pre-crisis peak and full-recovery levels.  
29 Some of these ingredients will be fleshed out formally in the model presented in Section IV. 
30 However, an alternative explanation would be that, following 3S, desired investment levels may be 
lower.  For example, to the extent that 3S is interpreted as evidence of an increase in uncertainty, it may be 
optimal to select lower investment levels.  
  21dwells on similarities in the post-collapse recovery phase.  Second, it looks at differences 
during the collapse phase, in order to shed some light on the causes of output collapse.  
Interestingly, the Great Depression also experienced a Phoenix Miracle-type 
process in that output recovery occurred with virtually no recovery of private sector 
credit.  Measured TFP also displays the same pattern as that observed in our EM sample 
of 3S output collapses:  It falls by 15.7 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough, and it 
recovers completely at the time of full-recovery in output (see Figure 1, Panel (F)).
31  
However, although measured TFP explains the largest proportion of the fluctuations in 
output from peak to trough and from trough to full recovery (55.3 percent and 60.8 
percent, respectively), changes in employment are also responsible for a large share of 
output variation.
32
The capital stock is very similar from pre-crisis peak to full-recovery (it falls by 
3.1 percent), and again, this is linked to the large drop in investment (see Figure 1, Panels 
(G) and (H)).  After having fallen by 73 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough, 
investment only closes 46 percent of the initial gap at the time of full recovery in output. 
Credit to the private sector falls by 43 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough. At 
full recovery, it is still 39 percent less than the prevailing level at pre-crisis peak time, 
implying that only 11 percent of the initial credit gap was closed at the time of full 
recovery (see Figure 1, panel (I)).  Output recovery was also “credit-less,” and, thus, the 
US Great Depression is a Phoenix Miracle.  
                                                 
31 Data on capital stock and employment levels used to derive TFP are obtained from Kendrick (1961).  
Just like for EMs, a Cobb-Douglas production function is used, but the share of capital in total income 
employed for calculations is 0.25 (also following Kendrick (1961)). 
32  Variation in employment levels explains 44.7 percent of output variation from peak to trough, and 41.7 
percent from trough to full recovery. 
  22However, differences become particularly evident when analyzing additional 
elements of the collapse phase.  Figure 2 displays the behavior of domestic price 
inflation, the nominal and real exchange rate (RER), and real wages.  Tests showing 
differences along pre-crisis peak, trough and full recovery points are presented in Table 
2.  Both sets of information support the following differences in the behavioral pattern for 
each of these variables: 
•  First and foremost, a key distinction that emerges on the monetary front is that, 
for EMs, annual inflation at the time of the trough is 16 percentage points above 
its pre-crisis peak levels (significant at the 1 percent level; see Table 2).  
Moreover, the average cumulative increase in domestic prices from peak to trough 
is 93 percent.  These developments contrast dramatically with the US Great 
Depression, where annual inflation at the time of the trough was –2.4 percent, 
compared to –1.1 percent at pre-crisis peak⎯in spite of the fact that devaluation 
took place precisely at the time of the trough, if anything, putting upward pressure 
on domestic prices.
33  Moreover, cumulative deflation exceeded 17 percent from 
pre-crisis peak to trough. 
•  While in the US the nominal exchange rate (against gold) basically remained at its 
1929 pre-crisis peak gold parity until mid-1933 (its trough year), EMs showed 
steady depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  However, the US devalued 
heavily around the time of the trough, so when considering pre-crisis peak to 
trough differences in the nominal exchange rate, the US experience (Figure 2, 
Panel F) is not very different from the behavior of the average EM (Figure 2, 
                                                 
33 The available measure of the US consumer price index excludes food items.  
  23Panel B).  Yet, differences become substantial at the time of full recovery, when 
average nominal exchange rates keep on rising dramatically in EMs, but not in the 
US. 
•  The dynamics for the RER also exhibited substantial differences.  For EM 
episodes, the RER shoots up by about 49 percent from pre-crisis peak to trough 
(and this increase is significant at the 1 percent level, see Table 2).
34  This fact is 
one of the key points regarding Sudden Stops and systemic crises made by Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi (2003), stressing the impact of a sudden collapse in external 
financing of the current account deficit over the RER.  More importantly, the 
RER does not go back to pre-crisis levels at full recovery.  As a matter of fact, the 
RER is on average about 55 percent higher at full recovery than at the pre-crisis 
peak point (and significant at the 1 percent level, see Table 2).  In contrast, the US 
experience is characterized by a steady real appreciation (vis-à-vis the pound) of 
about 23 percent until mid-1933 (covering most of the output contraction phase), 
and real depreciation of only 13 percent relative to pre-crisis peak levels by the 
time of full recovery. 
•  Another key difference emerges in the labor market.  Real wages in the US (using 
wholesale prices as a deflator) hit a peak by 1931, marking an increase of 30 
percent from pre-crisis peak levels.  Even when output reaches its trough, real 
wages remain 9 percent higher than at their pre-crisis peak value.  This is also the 
case at full recovery, when they are still 7 percent higher than at their pre-crisis 
peak.  This is one of the main elements behind traditional explanations of the 
Great Depression: rising real wages in a context of domestic price deflation and 
                                                 
34 An increase the RER is equivalent to a real depreciation of the domestic currency. 
  24limited nominal wage flexibility.  By contrast, in EM crisis episodes the average 
fall in real wages from pre-crisis peak to trough is close to 10 percent (although 
this estimate is not significant at the 10 percent level).
35 36   The fall continues 
from trough to full recovery by another 7 percent (but, again, it is not significant 
at the 10 percent level).  When compounding these two differences into one, i.e., 
when analyzing behavior between pre-crisis peak and full recovery, the fall in real 
wages amounts on average to 20 percent, and it is significant at the 1 percent level 
(see Table 2).  These facts show that even though there may be differences across 
countries in terms of the timing of the real wage adjustment process, there is 
definitely a substantial and significant drop in real wages by the time of full 
recovery, providing little support for the hypothesis that higher real wages are a 
dominant force behind output collapse in EMs. 
 
Table 2.  Phoenix Miracles:  Average Differences along 
 Pre-Crisis Peaks, Troughs, and Full Recovery Points for Selected Variables 
 
Trough to 
Recovery  Peak to Through Peak To Recovery 
  
CPI Inflation   15.869***  21.108  36.977 
   [ 5.248]  [ 22.104]  [ 24.140] 
   22  22  22 
Real Exchange Rate   49.315***  11.966   54.686*** 
   [ 12.342]  [ 14.181]  [ 14.333] 
   22  22  22 
Real Wages  -9.945  -7.222  -20.278*** 
   [ 6.721]  [ 6.168]  [ 4.868] 
   18  18  18 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Number of episodes is also reported. Coefficients show 
percentages differences for Real Exchange Rate and Real Wages and absolute 
differences for CPI Inflation. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
                                                 
35 It is significant at the 16 percent level. 
36 Due to lack of data, coverage of real wages reduces the sample to 18 out of 22 episodes.  
  25IV.  A Partial Equilibrium Model 
  A plausible conjecture that emerges from these stylized facts is that deep output 
collapse and miraculous-looking recovery are the result of shocks and vulnerabilities in 
the international and domestic capital markets.   This section will discuss a bare-bones 
model displaying those features.  This is a useful exercise because it helps lifting the veil 
of mystery from these facts, and suggests modeling strategies for future research.  To 
keep the analysis within reasonable bounds, we will conduct our discussion in terms of a 
partial equilibrium model.  The model places major emphasis on frictions in the financial 
sector and analyzes the implications of a sudden increase in short-term interest rates on 
firms’ decisions to produce, invest and borrow.
 37
  We will focus on bank credit for working capital and, for the sake of simplicity, 
assume that firms have to finance physical capital with retained earnings.  This pattern is 
especially relevant for economies in which there is poor effective creditor protection (as 
in Latin America, see IPES (2005)).  Under those circumstances, credit will likely be 
constrained to small and short-term projects, like those associated with working capital, 
i.e., capital utilized to finance inventory accumulation or the wage bill.
38
  Consider the case in which output of domestic goods is produced by physical 
capital, K, and inventories, Z.  Both have to be invested one period in advance.  Capital 
lasts forever while inventories are fully consumed by the one-period production process.  
For the sake of simplicity, we will conduct the discussion under the assumption that 
capital has a perfect secondary market subject to no adjustment costs.  Hence, assuming 
                                                 
37 Actually, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) carry out a calibration exercise in a related RBC model.  However, 
they do not address the issues raised here.  Moreover, they abstract from the EM credit market 
imperfections that motivate the present analysis. 
38 The role of short-term credit as a disciplining device is a familiar theme in the microeconomic theory of 
finance.  See, for example, Hart (1995). 
  26that the relative price of capital in terms of domestic output is unity, the firm can sell its 
capital for domestic output at a price equal to 1.  Let A denote the firm’s initial positive 
net assets (in terms of output), or net worth, which can be allocated to the accumulation 
of K, Z, and bank deposits, D.  Then, assuming without loss of generality that the relative 
price of inventories with respect to capital is unity, we have 
, D Z K B A + + = +       ( 1 )  
where B denotes one-period bank loans, respectively.  B can be utilized only to acquire 
inventories, and is constrained to be non-negative (i.e., firms can borrow from, but cannot 
lend to, banks).  Thus,  
. 0 Z B ≤ ≤        ( 2 )  
  The rate of interest at which firms borrow from banks (denoted by r) could be 
thought of as banks’ active interest rate, as opposed to their passive rate (denoted by ρ) 
that applies to bank deposits.  Moreover, r > ρ, and, to simplify the exposition, we will 
assume that the passive rate is small enough so that, under the conditions discussed in the 
rest of this section, firms will not have incentives to hold bank deposits.
 39  
We will first focus on a one-period maximization problem in which the firm is 
supposed to maximize next-period initial net assets. Let us define the firm’s gross 
revenue (denoted by π) by 
), 1 ( ) , ( r B Z K F + − = π       ( 3 )  
where gross production function F is assumed to be linear homogenous.  Besides, to 
ensure interior solutions in K and Z, we assume that the flow production function satisfies 
                                                 
39 In the spirit of partial equilibrium analysis, we will not model the spread between the active and the 
passive rates. 
  2740 Inada’s conditions, for example.   Denoting by A’ the firm’s next-period net assets, then, 
constraining the firm to hold no bank deposits (i.e., setting D = 0), it follows that A’ = π.  
Thus, if bank deposits were not an attractive investment option for the firm, 
maximization of next-period initial net assets, A’, would be equivalent to maximizing π, 
subject to the corresponding inequality constraints.  We will follow that route, and later 
show that deposit rate ρ can always be assumed small enough so that firms will find it 
optimal not to hold bank deposits.  Thus, maximizing π would be tantamount to 
maximizing next-period initial net assets (without imposing the constraint D = 0). 
We will now discuss the maximization of gross revenue π in a more formal way.  
The problem consists of maximizing expression (3) with respect to B and Z, subject to D 
= 0, and expressions (1) and (2).  Hence, employing (1) to substitute for K, the associated 
Kuhn-Tucker expression is
41  
, ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( B B Z r B Z Z B A F ξ + − γ + + − − +     (4) 
where γ and ξ are non-negative parameters, and 
. 0 ) ( = ξ = − γ B B Z        ( 5 )  
Thus, the first-order conditions with respect to B and Z are, respectively, 
, 0 ) 1 ( ) , ( = ξ + γ − + − r Z K FK       ( 6 )  
and, 
, 0 ) , ( ) , ( = γ + + − Z K F Z K F Z K       ( 7 )  
where Fj, j = K, Z, denotes the partial derivative of function F with respect to j. 
                                                 
40 Let the flow production function be f(K,Z); then, by definition, F(K,Z) = f(K,Z) + K. 
41 Notice that since constraints are linear, Kuhn-Tucker’s regularity condition holds a fortiori. 
  28The Borderline Case.  Let us first consider the case in which no constraint in expression 
(2) is binding.  Hence, by (5), (6) and (7), we have γ = ξ = 0, implying that 
, 1 ) , ( r Z K FK + =       ( 8 )  
and 
. 1 ) , ( r Z K FZ + =       ( 9 )  
Hence, given that F is linear homogeneous in K and Z, we have 
, ) 1 ( ) 1 ( A r r B Z F K F Z K + = + − + = π      ( 1 0 )  
where the first equality follows from linear homogeneity, and the second from equations 
(1), (8) and (9).  Notice that in this case gross revenue is equivalent to lending A at rate r 
> deposit rate ρ; thus, the asset-maximizing firm will set D = 0, even if the constraint had 
not being imposed,
 showing that asset maximization is equivalent to gross revenue 
maximization.
42  More interesting is the fact that gross revenue is independent of whether 
inventories are completely, partially or not at all financed with bank loans (i.e., gross 
revenue is independent on B as long as it satisfies expression (2)).  For the sake of 
concreteness, we will assume that under these circumstances, the firm chooses to entirely 
finance its inventories through bank loans—but the above indifference property will be 
revisited when we discuss the Deep Crisis case later on. 
  Notice that, given that F is linear homogeneous, there exists a unique r 
simultaneously satisfying equations (8) and (9).  This is the reason why we refer to the 
present case as the Borderline Case.  The two other “robust” cases are: the Normal case 
in which the gross marginal productivity of capital exceeds 1 + r, and the Deep Crisis 
                                                 
42 This implication is unrealistic because firms are typically large holders of bank deposits.  However, as a 
general rule, bank deposits are likely to be held for liquidity reasons, not because they are attractive 
investment projects.  Thus, abstracting from the liquidity motive for the holding of deposits can be justified 
as a first approximation in a non-monetary model. 
  29case in which the gross marginal productivity of capital falls short of 1 + r.  For future 
reference, we will denote the value of r giving rise to the Borderline Case by r
b.  The 
determination of r
b in reference to the factor-price frontier is depicted in Figure 6. 
















Normal Deep Crisis  
Normal Case.  This corresponds to a situation in which firms, if allowed, would like to 
borrow in order to accumulate physical capital K, implying that B > 0, ξ = 0, Z = B, and γ 
> 0.  In words, inventory accumulation would be fully financed by bank credit and, if 
possible, firms would like to borrow more in order to accumulate physical capital (which 
the model does not allow).  We call this the Normal Case because we envision firms in 
EMs as being, in principle, highly profitable, to the extent that firms would like to finance 
their capital accumulation on bank loans, despite the fact that bank loans could be very 
expensive.  A possible reason why firms end up relying so heavily on their own resources 
is poor credit-market institutions implying, more specifically, poor creditors’ protection 
(see IPES 2005). 
  30By (6) and (7), it readily follows that 
, 0 ) 1 ( ) , ( > γ = + − r Z K FK      ( 1 1 )  
and, 
. 1 ) , ( r Z K FZ + =              (12) 
This case is identified in Figure 6 to the left of r
b. Notice that, by (11), the gross marginal 
productivity of capital is larger than (1 + r), a fact that can be used, as in the borderline 
case, to show that gross revenue maximization is equivalent to profit maximization 
(recalling that r > ρ).  Equation (12) is just the same equilibrium condition that prevails in 
the borderline case discussed above (recall equation (9)).  Moreover, given that 
inventories are fully financed by bank loans, it follows from equation (1) that the firm 
will devote its net assets to the accumulation of physical capital.  Hence, K = A.    
  We will now sketch out some dynamic considerations, assuming that the one-
period maximization problem is repeated each period.  Once again, let A’ denote “the 
firm’s next-period initial net assets,” and, for the sake of concreteness, let us focus on a 
periods in which r is constant.  We will denote by z the inventory/capital ratio, Z/K.  
Linear homogeneity implies, recalling (12), that z is determined once r is known.  This 
implies that firms will expand along a constant inventory/capital ray z.  
From equation (3), the fact that B=Z, and linear homogeneity of F(K,Z), we get 
. ) , ( K Z K FK = π       ( 1 3 )  
  As already noted, firms will employ their entire net assets to accumulate physical 
capital.  Therefore, if “next period capital” is denoted by K’, we have, by (11), (12) and 
(13), and recalling that K’ = A’ = π that 
), 1 ( ) 1 ( ' mpk r K K + = + + = γ      ( 1 4 )  
  31where mpk stands for net Marginal Productivity of Capital.  Clearly, mpk > r, and due to 
linear homogeneity, mpk is a negative function of r.  We will collect the main results in 
the following Proposition: 
Proposition 1.  In the Normal case, the gross marginal productivity of capital 
exceeds the interest rate factor 1 + r on working capital loans, and the firm’s own 
assets are entirely devoted to physical capital accumulation.  Moreover, in 
periods in which r is constant, output, capital, and inventories will grow at a rate 
equal to the equilibrium net marginal productivity of capital.  The latter is a 
downward-sloping function of the interest rate on working capital loans. 
  We will now show that all the main stylized facts highlighted in the previous 
sections are borne out in the Normal case, if we interpret the Sudden Stop in capital flows 
shock as a jump in working capital interest rate r to a (temporarily) higher plateau, and 
assume that the elasticity of substitution between K and Z is less than unity.   
An increase in r that keeps firms in the Normal phase implies, by (11), a fall in Z, 
since the inventory/capital ratio must fall, and capital remains the same.  This results in a 
fall in output and the net marginal productivity of capital, mpk.
43  Afterwards, growth 
resumes but at a lower rate (recall equation (14)).  On the other hand, the 
investment/output ratio is given by 
44
                                                 
43 Notice that since a rise in the interest rate for working capital results in lower output, the model helps to 
capture a situation in which “capacity underutilization” increases during a Sudden Stop episode.  Under this 
optic, capacity underutilization is not a demand-driven phenomenon as in a typical textbook Keynesian 
model, but it is a result of tighter credit constraints, which would not be there under perfect credit markets.  
Thus, capacity underutilization, as the term has been loosely used in the text, should be interpreted as being 
measured relative to a first-best equilibrium (or an equilibrium in which credit market distortions are much 
less severe). 
44 In the empirical analysis we focus on ratios with respect to GDP.  This cannot be replicated here because 
we are working in terms of a partial equilibrium model.  Dividing by the sector’s output is an 
approximation, which would be an exact replica of the empirical analysis if inventories were produced at 
home and if (r – ρ)B is recorded as part of the value added in the banking sector. 
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      ( 1 5 )  
which would be constant if the flow production function, F – K, is Cobb-Douglas.  
However, in the more realistic case in which the elasticity of substitution between K and 
Z is less than unity, a fall in the inventory/capital ratio (associated with a rise in r) would 
result in a fall in the share of capital and hence, by (15), in the investment/output ratio.  
This result is consistent with the empirical observation that the investment/output ratio is 
lower following a 3S collapse.    
Finally, the credit/output ratio is given by 
,




K Z K F
Z
      ( 1 6 )  
45 which falls as z contracts (which is in line with the data discussed in previous sections).
  There is a technical point that needs to be addressed.  By (10) and (14), physical 
capital and profits grow at the rate mpk > ρ and, therefore, the present discounted net 
assets, A, may not converge if the discount rate is ρ, unless, for example, after a given 
point in time mpk = ρ.  This is a familiar difficulty in open-economy models, which is 
usually formally resolved by assuming that eventually price and interest configurations 
ensure the existence of a stationary steady state (e.g., at the risk of sounding repetitious, 
that after some point in time mpk = ρ).  Due to the model’s linearity and, thus, the bang-
bang nature of optimal solutions, it can readily be shown that Proposition 1 (above) and 2 
                                                 
45 However, there is a slight difference with the data in that here credit as a share of GDP falls at trough 
time and it remains lower at the time of full recovery, whereas in the empirical section credit as a share of 
GDP remains the same on average at trough time, and later declines as GDP recovers.  
  33(below) hold true, as long as price/interest configurations that ensure the existence of 
present discounted values are exogenous.
46 47      
Deep Crisis Case.  It corresponds to the situation in which r rises above the borderline 
case where no inequality constraint (expression (2)) is binding—resulting in γ = 0, and ξ 
> 0.  See Figure 6.  Thus, by (4), 
, 0 ) 1 ( ) , ( < ξ − = + − r Z K FK       ( 1 7 )  
and, 
), 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( r Z K F Z K F K Z + < =      ( 1 8 )  
where the inequality in expression (18) follows from (17).  Once again, to ensure that 
gross revenue maximization is equivalent to next-period net asset maximization, we will 
focus on the case in which FK > 1+ρ.  Notice that (18) is satisfied in the Borderline Case 
(dividing equation (9) by equation (8)).  This implies (because of linear homogeneity) 
that the inventory/capital ratio is the same in Deep Crisis as in the Borderline Case.  Let 
z
b denote the inventory/capital ratio corresponding to the borderline case.  Then, in Deep 
Crisis, 
. K z Z b =        ( 1 9 )  
In Deep Crisis B = 0, i.e., there is no bank borrowing.  Hence, by equations (1) and (19), 
. ) 1 ( K z Z K A









=       ( 2 1 )  
                                                 
46 If, in contrast to the present model, the maximand were not linear in K, for example, the level of K would 
be a factor determining the rate of investment. 
47 Alternatively, Proposition 1 would also hold true if it is assumed that beyond a given output scale, the 
maximand becomes concave in K, e.g., because of the existence of a fixed factor.  
 
  34Contrary to previous cases, the demand for capital is lower than it would be if the firm’s 
available assets were entirely devoted to investment in physical capital.  The intuition for 
this is that, given the high cost of working-capital credit, firms prefer to use their own 
resources to accumulate inventories.  This result is in line with the empirical observation 
that credit remains constant following 3S collapse episodes.  Moreover, net output = 
F(K,Z) – K = [F(1,z
b) – 1]K < [F(1,z
b) – 1]A.  Thus, the output loss, given by the 
difference of the last two expressions, is, recalling (21), a constant independent of r.  This 
implies that a slight increase of r over the Borderline Case results in a discontinuous 
output contraction, independently of how small the interest rate hike is.  This is a very 
interesting feature of the model. 
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Hence, by (21) and (22), the investment/output ratio in Deep Crisis satisfies: 
1
1 .
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We will now compute the investment/output ratio for de Borderline Case.  It should be 
recalled that in this case inventories are entirely financed by bank loans.  Thus, in the 
Borderline Case the investment/output ratio satisfies: 
,
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    (24) 
which equals expression (23) if the following holds true: If the interest rate on bank loans 
r = r
b (i.e., the Borderline interest rate), then, given A, gross revenue π is the same as the 
  35Borderline Case even though inventories are fully financed from own resources.  But this 
is precisely what we proved at the end of the subsection on the Borderline Case.  
Moreover, by (23) and recalling that π = (1 + r
b)A, it follows that 
.
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The following Proposition collects the central implications of the analysis: 
Proposition 2.  Firms enter into Deep Crisis as the rate of interest exceeds the 
level that gives rise to the borderline case (in which no inequality constraint is 
binding).  However, the inventory/capital ratio remains as in the borderline case.  
In contrast, the demand for working capital credit vanishes, and the demand for 
capital falls.  As a result, output and the credit/output ratio fall.  The extent of the 
discontinuous output fall is independent of how small or how large is the rise in r 
(in the region in which it is profitable to keep the firm in operation).  Moreover, 
inside the Deep Crisis region, the investment/output ratio is constant and equal to 
the one prevailing in the Borderline Case. 
An implication of the above analysis is that if the economy starts on the Normal 
Case and r rises above r
b, output will suffer a strong contraction, bank credit will dry up, 
and investment as a share of output will fall.  These features are very much in line with 
the empirical evidence summarized above.  After the shock, however, output starts to rise 
to the extent that the shock does not lower the capital rate of return below the deposit 
interest rate ρ – giving rise to a pattern that invites comparison with the proverbial bird. 
Further Insights from the Model.  The model highlights how imperfections in the capital 
market could open the door to major crises.  In the model, firms may borrow short-term 
  36for projects that would be very costly to discontinue because, for instance, it is not 
possible to effectively attach loan collaterals.  The risk is that the capital market may stop 
working smoothly (e.g., because of a global financial shock, like the Russian crisis and 
related events in 1998), resulting in a sharp rise in the interest rate of working capital 
loans or, more generally, loans that would be very costly to discontinue.
 48  Therefore, in 
the final analysis, Sudden Stops and Phoenix Miracles may be reflecting fundamental 
weaknesses in EMs’ domestic financial systems, which, combined with global shocks, 
give rise to major crises. 
Related literature.  As noted at the outset of this section, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) have 
worked out an RBC model that captures some of the flavor of our model.  As in our 
setup, interest rates on working capital loans are assumed exogenous to the model.  This 
is a plausible assumption given the prevalence of factors that are external to EMs, which, 
among other things, is reflected in a remarkable bunching of crisis episodes.  A similar 
research strategy is followed in Mendoza and Smith (2002), for example, although the 
exogenous crisis-triggering factors are Sudden Stops.   
 
V.  Summary and Some Implications 
Results in this paper support the view that recent capital-market crises in 
Emerging Market economies reflect the existence of serious malfunctioning in the 
financial system (e.g., excessive short-term lending and Liability Dollarization).  This 
makes economies vulnerable to shocks that otherwise would result in mild recessions.   
Interestingly, however, output-collapse episodes in EMs show that recovery can 
be fast and take place without credit in a Phoenix-like fashion.  This characteristic is 
                                                 
48  See Calvo (2005). 
  37shared by the US Great depression, which also has in common the failure of the domestic 
banking system, possibly a key feature to explain credit stagnation during the output 
recovery phase. 
Credit-less recovery sounds paradoxical but, upon reflection, it is not.  As shown 
in the model developed in Section IV, an output collapse may be the result of a “liquidity 
crunch” provoked by a sharp increase in interest rates.  Liquidity, however, can be 
restored by different means, one of which is a discontinuation of investment projects.  In 
this fashion, liquidity and output thus increase, while investment (a key engine of growth 
under normal circumstances) collapses. 
Lowering the rate of investment is not the only way firms could try to offset 
liquidity crunch.  How firms deal with that situation is a research topic on which we 
know very little.  Progress on this account will likely call for detailed microeconomic 
data and analysis, thus opening a large and exciting research agenda. 
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  40Appendix Table 1. 
Episodes of Output Contraction, 1980-2004  
 
 
Type  Country  Peak  Trough  Recovery
Output 
Decline
Type Country Peak  Trough  Recovery
Output 
Decline
Mild  Algeria  1986  1988  1989  -1.69% Collapse Argentina 1980  1982  1984 -10.36%
Mild  Algeria  1990  1991  1992  -1.20% Collapse Argentina 1998  2002  2004 -18.36%
Mild  Algeria  1992  1994  1995  -2.98% Mild Argentina 1994  1995  1996 -2.85%
Collapse  Argentina  1984  1985  1987  -7.59% Collapse Brazil 1980  1983  1985 -7.12%
Collapse  Argentina  1987  1990  1992  -12.02% Collapse Chile 1981  1983  1986 -13.72%
Mild  Brazil  1987  1988  1989  -0.10% Mild Chile 1998  1999  2000 -1.14%
Mild  Brazil  1989  1990  1991  -4.30% Mild Colombia 1998  1999  2002 -4.20%
Mild  Brazil  1991  1992  1993  -0.50% Collapse Côte d'Ivoire 1982  1984  1986 -6.50%
Mild  Brazil  2002  2003  2004  -0.20% Collapse Ecuador 1998  1999  2001 -6.30%
Collapse  Bulgaria  1988  1993  1995  -26.49% Mild Ecuador 1981  1983  1984 -3.09%
Collapse  Bulgaria  1995  1997  2002  -14.47% Collapse El Salvador 1980  1982  1992 -16.10%
Collapse  Côte d'Ivoire  2001  2004  -  -6.18% Collapse Indonesia 1997  1998  2003 -13.13%
Mild  Côte d'Ivoire  1986  1987  1988  -0.35% Mild Lebanon 1999  2000  2001 -0.50%
Mild  Côte d'Ivoire  1989  1990  1991  -1.10% Collapse Malaysia 1997  1998  2000 -7.36%
Mild  Côte d'Ivoire  1991  1993  1994  -0.44% Collapse Mexico 1981  1983  1985 -4.80%
Mild  Côte d'Ivoire  1999  2000  2001  -2.27% Collapse Mexico 1994  1995  1997 -6.17%
Collapse  Croatia  1990  1993  2004  -35.92% Collapse Morocco 1994  1995  1996 -6.58%
Collapse  Czech Republic  1990  1992  2000  -12.07% Mild Morocco 1980  1981  1982 -2.76%
Collapse  Dominican Republic  1989  1990  1992  -5.83% Mild Morocco 1982  1983  1984 -0.56%
Mild  Dominican Republic  2002  2003  2004  -0.40% Mild Morocco 1996  1997  1998 -2.23%
Mild  Ecuador  1986  1987  1988  -2.15% Collapse Nigeria 1980  1984  1989 -21.88%
Collapse  Hungary  1989  1993  2000  -18.05% Collapse Peru 1981  1983  1986 -12.33%
Mild  Hungary  1984  1985  1986  -0.25% Mild Peru 1997  1998  1999 -0.65%
Mild  Hungary  1987  1988  1989  -0.07% Mild Philippines 1997  1998  1999 -0.58%
Collapse  Lebanon  1988  1989  1991  -42.45% Collapse Russia 1997  1998  1999 -5.30%
Mild  Malaysia  1984  1985  1986  -1.12% Collapse South Africa 1981  1983  1984 -6.07%
Mild  Mexico  1985  1986  1989  -3.75% Collapse South Korea 1997  1998  1999 -6.85%
Mild  Mexico  2000  2001  2002  -0.12% Collapse Thailand 1996  1998  2002 -11.74%
Collapse  Morocco  1991  1993  1994  -5.00% Mild Tunisia 1981  1982  1983 -0.49%
Mild  Morocco  1986  1987  1988  -2.54% Collapse Turkey 1993  1994  1995 -5.46%
Mild  Morocco  1998  1999  2000  -0.08% Collapse Turkey 1998  1999  2000 -4.71%
Collapse  Panama  1982  1983  1985  -4.49% Collapse Uruguay 1981  1984  1991 -19.95%
Collapse  Panama  1986  1988  1991  -14.95% Collapse Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1980  1983  1986 -6.10%
Collapse  Peru  1987  1990  1996  -23.53%
Collapse  Philippines  1983  1985  1989  -14.10%
Mild  Philippines  1990  1991  1993  -0.58%
Collapse  Poland  1990  1991  1994  -7.01%
Collapse  Russia  1989  1996  1997  -41.91%
Mild  South Africa  1984  1985  1988  -4.00%
Mild  South Africa  1989  1992  1994  -3.44%
Mild  Tunisia  1985  1986  1987  -1.45%
Collapse  Turkey  2000  2001  2003  -7.49%
Collapse  Ukraine  1989  1999  2004  -61.59%
Collapse  Uruguay  1998  2002  2004  -17.69%
Mild  Uruguay  1994  1995  1996  -1.45%
Collapse  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1988  1989  1991  -8.57%
Collapse  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1998  1999  2001  -6.09%
Collapse  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  2001  2003  2004  -15.91%
Mild  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1993  1994  1995  -2.35%
Mild  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1995  1996  1997  -0.19%
Non-Systemic Episodes  3S  Episodes 
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  3S Collapse Episodes 
Country  Peak Trough Recovery
 Output  
Decline  
Argentina  1980 1982 1984 -10.36% 
Argentina  1998 2002 2004 -18.36% 
Brazil  1980 1983 1985 -7.12% 
Chile  1981 1983 1986 -13.72% 
Côte d'Ivoire  1982 1984 1986 -6.50% 
Ecuador  1998 1999 2001 -6.30% 
El Salvador  1980 1982 1992 -16.10% 
Indonesia  1997 1998 2003 -13.13% 
Malaysia  1997 1998 2000 -7.36% 
Mexico  1981 1983 1985 -4.80% 
Mexico  1994 1995 1997 -6.17% 
Morocco  1994 1995 1996 -6.58% 
Nigeria  1980 1984 1989 -21.88% 
Peru  1981 1983 1986 -12.33% 
Russia  1997 1998 1999 -5.30% 
South Africa  1981 1983 1984 -6.07% 
South Korea  1997 1998 1999 -6.85% 
Thailand  1996 1998 2002 -11.74% 
Turkey  1993 1994 1995 -5.46% 
Turkey  1998 1999 2000 -4.71% 
Uruguay  1981 1984 1991 -19.95% 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1980 1983 1986 -6.10%     
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Data Appendix 
 
Our sample of EMs is composed of those countries tracked by JP Morgan to construct its global Emerging Market Bond Index. The complete list of EMs includes 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Data is collected on an annual basis unless otherwise stated. Data on nominal GDP, real GDP and investment for the US Great 
Depression comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Credit, nominal wages, producer price index, nominal exchange rate (vis-à-vis gold), and real exchange 
rate (vis-à-vis Pound) comes from NBER’s Macro-history database.  Data on employment and the capital stock come from Kendrick (1961), and data on the 
current account balance is from Mitchell (1998). 
 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Net Capital flows  Monthly Net Capital Flows are proxied by computing trade balance net of changes in international reserves.  All 
figures are expressed in 2000 US dollars.  This series is used to construct country-specific capital flow windows 
used in the computation of the 3S index (see main text for details).  Source: IMF IFS. 
EMBI Index  Emerging Markets Bond Index (monthly).  Source: JP Morgan. 
Fed Funds Rate  Effective Fed Funds Rate (monthly). Source: Federal Reserve. This variable was used as a proxy for EMBI to 
construct our systemic capital market turmoil indicator from 1980 to 1992 (EMBI is available only from 1990 
onwards.  A two-year interval is used to construct initial mean and standard deviation measures).  
Gross Domestic Product  Real Gross Domestic Product. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (WDI), except for 
Lebanon and Poland, whose GDP data are from IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.  
Investment  Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Source: WDI, except for Poland and Russia whose investment data are from 
WEO. 
Credit  Credit to the Private Sector. Source: IMF IFS (Deposit Money Banks line 22d).  
Consumer Price Index  Consumer Price Index. Source: IMF IFS. 
Nominal Exchange Rate  Nominal Exchange Rate (Domestic Currency vis-à-vis USD, period average). Source: IMF IFS. 
Current Account Balance Current  Account  Balance.  Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
Employment  Total employment. Source: WEO. 
Wages  Data on wages was obtained from International Labor Organization (ILO) database (complemented with data 
from CEPAL, Asian Development Bank, IFS and Central Bank databases). 
WPI/PPI  Data on Wholesale Price Index or Producer Prices Index was obtained form IMF IFS database (complemented for 
a few cases with data from United Nations Statistics Division, country’s statistics offices, and central banks 
databases). 
Capital Stock  Constructed using perpetual inventory method from 1980 onwards. Initial capital stocks for 1980 come from 
Nehru and Dhareshwar’s database. Data on investment corresponds to Gross Fixed Capital Formation. The 
assumed annual rate of depreciation of 8% is taken from Mendoza and Durdu (forthcoming). Appendix 1 - Mild Recessions vs. Output Collapses 
One may ask whether the Phoenix Miracle occurs only in episodes displaying 
output collapse.  For this reason, we compare 3S output collapses with 3S mild recessions 
(i.e., 3S episodes with cumulative contractions in output smaller than the median 
contraction). This leaves us with 22 output collapse episodes and 11 mild recession 
episodes. Given the small number of mild episodes, we interpret these differences with 
caution.  Under this new classification, the salient features that seem to separate collapses 
from mild recessions in terms of Phoenix Miracle characteristics are as follows (see 
Table 3 for point estimates and tests): 
•  There seems to be no clear difference in domestic credit to the private sector as a 
share of GDP between pre-crisis peak and full recovery points for mild recessions, an 
element that, as previously stated, does come out distinctively for collapses.  This 
suggests that expansions following mild recessions are likely to take place with 
increases in credit, a feature that differs from the “credit-less” recoveries that embody  
Phoenix Miracles.   
•  In terms of external financing, there seems to be more dispersion across mild 
recessions.  Although the coefficient indicating differences from pre-crisis peak to 
full-time recovery time in the current account balance measured in points of GDP is 
2.7, it is not significant at the 10 percent level, yet another difference with collapses 
(where differences in the current account balance are much larger and statistically 
significant). 
It is also worth highlighting that, in contrast to mild recessions, 3S collapse 
episodes fully pass tests bank credit and current account balance differences, representing 
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the quintessence of Phoenix Miracles.  Moreover, they account for two-thirds of the 
number of 3S contraction episodes analyzed here (22 cases out of 33), with an average 
output collapse of almost 10 percent.
49  This fact points to the relevance of 3S events in 
the behavior of output in EMs.   
Table 3.  Mild Recession Episodes: Average Differences 
along Pre-crisis peaks, Troughs, and Full Recovery Points 
 
  




Credit/GDP -0.317  -2.624  -2.008 
   [ 4.723]  [ 2.212]  [ 6.145] 
   11  11  11 
Current Account Balance/GDP   2.405*  0.287  2.692 
   [ 1.217]  [ 0.816]  [ 1.487] 
 11  11  11 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Number of episodes is also reported. Percentages 
differences for Credit and differences in points of GDP for the Current Account Balance. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
49  This contrasts with non-systemic episodes in our sample of contractions, where only 38 percent come 
along with collapses in output. 